Release Notes - v0.213.1
v0.213.1
Section titled “v0.213.1”Title: Strengthen validation and protect derived key material
Version: v0.213.1
This release strengthens block, transaction, protocol, and cryptographic checks while limiting resource growth when composite CBOR map keys are processed.
Bug Fixes
Section titled “Bug Fixes”-
Fixed block body verification to consume the complete outer transaction array and reject trailing CBOR or non-CBOR bytes.
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Corrected phase two validation across Alonzo through Dijkstra by executing required Plutus scripts and requiring execution outcomes to match
TxIsValid, with deterministic handling for unexpected success and malformed reference scripts. -
Improved reward recipient allocation validation by comparing each operator and delegator allocation by
RewardCredential, rejecting missing, additional, substituted, and credential kind mismatches instead of comparing totals only. -
Matched ChainSync intersection replies only when the slot and hash exactly matched an offered
FindIntersectpoint tied to a pending request; unsolicited or unoffered replies now return errors without callbacks or tip publication.
Security
Section titled “Security”-
Added secure wiping for temporary KES and VRF derived key material on success and error paths while preserving returned outputs.
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Hardened KES signing key validation by checking key depth and exact data length before signing, updating, or deriving public keys; malformed keys now return errors or
nilrather than panic, while cached public keys remain available after zeroization. -
Strengthened Byron SSC payload validation to reject malformed payloads before processing.
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Bounded composite CBOR map key hashing by accumulating identity digests during nested map and array decoding, preserving duplicate key detection while preventing repeated subtree traversal from causing unbounded CPU and allocation growth.
Full Changelog: v0.213.0…v0.213.1
Release: v0.213.1
Docs authored by Doc Holiday